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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF
PROFESSOR SCHAEFER AND MR. GRENIER
QUESTION, MS. VERNON: I want to ask Professor Schaefer first if you
had any comments you would like to make regarding Mr. Grenier's
presentation before we open it up to the floor.
COMMENT, MR. SCHAEFER: I have just one on the language you used
regarding the cooperation on disputes; you mentioned there is some wiggle
room. There is wiggle room even in the U.S. statutory provisions in the
NAFTA implementing act and Uruguay Round implementing act in terms of
state involvement. That just reemphasized the need for there to be a cultural
change, an attitudinal change, that includes full participation. We are seeing
it in the United States as I mentioned going through the disputes. So I do not
know if there is that cultural or attitudinal change in Canada, but we are
seeing it in the United States
COMMENT, MR. GRENIER: I agree. I think it is the same in Canada.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I wanted to ask Matt, what has
threatened the impact on environmental legislation in Chapter 11? There has
been some concern on the part of environmentalists that this would have
some adverse affects on existing environmental legislation. Do you see this
as a potentially explosive issue, Matt?
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: It is potentially explosive. But
we have to remember one of the things that happened after NAFTA and the
WTO agreements were concluded. We did have some environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) trying to enlist states' opposition to
trade agreements. They came up with these laundry lists of state laws, many
of which in the environmental sector could be subject to challenge such as
the Delaney Clause, or the California Proposition. I have the right number.
There were sixty-five on carcinogens. It has not come to pass. There has not
been, in the fifty-three years and counting, one case against state measures
successfully pleaded in the GATT. In fact, states largely have not complied
with it. A lot of the measures not involved in the Beer 11 case are
commercially insignificant. This is why Canada has not re-upped the case in
the WTO, in part. But there has only been one case. So these laundry lists fail
to take into account, again, of a lot of what the obligations and agreements
actually require.
Now, on the Chapter 11, specifically though, measures tantamount to
expropriation, there is a lot of concern that that is going to be used to go after
environmental regulation.
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COMMENT, PROFESSOR KING: That is what I am talking about.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: I will have to agree with what
Dan Price said yesterday. Regulatory takings are recognized in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence. They are recognized, to a certain degree, in
international arbitral jurisprudence. We ought to wait and see what results
come about under the cases before we jump into it.
I have no doubt, though, if the United States loses Loewen or the
California MTBE cases, there is going to be an outcry and an outrage. But
we ought to look at the specifics of those measures in the justification form.
For instance, in the MTBE case, no studies have shown adverse health
effects of MTBE in groundwater. It does create an odor. It does create a
smell. But nobody knows for sure what the effects are. There has been a ton
of resources spent by environmental organizations attacking international
trade agreements over the past ten years. What we have seen is that some of
the focus was lost on domestic issues; clean water, clean air, and MTBE, was
lost at the expense of things that are easier to collect monies for, like
attacking international trade agreements and foreign institutions. It probably
has not been a wise use of resources by environmental organizations.
Yes, there are legitimate concerns within the trade agreements, but we
ought to realize that these are not enemies. We ought to be concerned as
much about our own domestic laws and making sure the science is done on
those, as well.
QUESTION, MR. MURPHY: This is a question for Professor Schaefer. I
am Terry Murphy, a proud graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: Ditto.
QUESTION, MR. MURPHY: Go Blue. Would you please put your
White House hat back on for this? We have a brief in the Supreme Court in
the Burma case in effect supporting the federal government's powers over
foreign affairs. You did mention your view that it is important to maintain a
central authority over foreign affairs in some way. I would hope that is
shared around this room.
But I wonder whether you could speculate or even if you know why the
United States did not choose to enter the Burma case until the absolute last
possible minute? It had a rebuke from the First Circuit Court of Appeals for
failing to protect the foreign affairs powers of the United States central
government, and it did not come into that case until the last hour of the last
day of the 14th of February of the year 2000. We did not know until they
were filing whether they would file at all.
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: I am not at liberty, obviously, to
reveal any internal discussions that occurred. It is clear, though, the stakes at
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the Supreme Court level are different than at the First Circuit Court level. I
am not trying to sell these things. I am hoping they do not collect dust on the
shelves. I did hold up a couple law review articles I have done in connection
with this conference earlier. I had one on the shelf, ironically, before I went
to the White House. I agree completely with the First Circuit analysis, that it
should be struck down on all three grounds. The unpublished article I have
would conclude the same thing.
The predictions are going to be potentially a five-four case, very close. I
do hope the measure is struck down, at least on one of the grounds. These
cases do not make it to the Supreme Court very often. They have taken
certiorari, and it may set precedent for the next fifty to one-hundred years.
You can see the problems that may be created if a halt is not put to this type
of activity.
COMMENT, MR. MURPHY: I would have thought it would be a nobrainer for the United States government to advocate in that area.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: The First Circuit struck it
down on all three grounds. So the failure of the Executive Branch to file an
amicus brief before the First Circuit did not affect the result in any way,
shape, or form.
COMMENT, MR. MURPHY: The First Circuit rebuked the United
States government in a footnote.
COMMENT, MS. VALENTINE: I am speaking as an ex-member of the
Department of Justice. I am now the general counsel for the Federal Trade
Commission. I do not know anything about the facts of this case, but as a
general matter, the U.S. government does not get involved in cases at the
appellate level. Had the Court wanted, the Court could have asked the
Attorney General, in fact, to file an amicus brief. Even at the Supreme Court
level, we will generally avoid getting involved at the petition for certiorari
stage and only come in on this important issue affecting the U.S. government
once the petition seeking certiorari is granted.
Now, whether this case, because of its being so central to federal power,
the federal-state issue as opposed to your usual dispute with private parties, it
should have been subject to different rules. It is not that unusual at all for the
government to do that.
COMMENT, MR. MURPHY: I can tell you that a senior member of the
White House Legal Affairs Office told me personally in the Supreme Court
on the day that case was argued that they were very worried that the Solicitor
General of the United States of America would have been rebuked by the
Justices of the Supreme Court that morning for failure to defend the interest
of the United States in that case. They were worried about a public rebuke to
the Solicitor General in open court.
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COMMENT, MR. DAVIS ROBINSON: I might add something. As I
spoke with you yesterday, the turf wars that go on between the State
Department and the Justice Department in almost every government are
absolutely incredible, and this is a very good example. In the case of the
United States, the Department of Justice and the Solicitor General's Office
are in charge of filing all the briefs filed in U.S. courts. However, when it
comes to international law, the Department of State is fundamentally
responsible for input in those briefs, however it is with great resistance from
the Justice Department. But they have the final say.
As I said yesterday, in the case of international tribunals, it is exactly the
reverse. Whereas the Department of State has been extremely willing over
the years to help the Justice Department in the U.S. cases, I am sorry to say
such has not been the case in the reverse. This is an intensely political area. I
would argue that, frankly, the Justice Department is much more subjected to
internal political forces, especially in certain administrations. This case has
been out of the ordinary in that area. So I do not know the answer to this. It is
absolutely shocking, after my time in office, the West Side Highway in New
York, which has been a disgrace for forty years now, was held up for years
because American-South African policy was being run by the mayors of our
cities rather than by the Secretary of State. If you think you could get the
Justice Department to do anything about it, you better think twice.
COMMENT, MR. Von FINCKENSTEIN: As a former trade negotiator
and a federal civil servant, I cannot help but take issue with Carl. Carl, you
went through a long description of how the internal coronation process works
between the federal governments and provinces and the steps being taken to
make sure that there is an adequate hold for the provinces so that they can be
heard; the various committees, the sea trade committees, the best practices
document, and how you are in the next room or at the table depending on the
issues.
Then you went through lessons you have learned. You made two
statements. First you said that private parties define the national interests, not
the national government. And then you said that no one is at the helm. I do
not understand. You are saying the whole process does not work, or you are
saying there is a fear of leadership by the government. Or when the process
works, it does not work in terms of Softwood Lumber. Needless to say, I
disagree with all three conclusions.
COMMENT, MR. GRENIER: I think it is a bit of both. The process
seems to have worked overall. But when very, very large interests are at
stake, as they are in the Softwood Lumber case, and because this case has
been going on for so many years, then it is quite evident for anyone dealing
with the case now that the federal government is extremely reluctant to offer
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leadership on the question. They are waiting for the industry. I am not
blaming them for that, by the way. They were burned badly by the industry
the last time around, and so they have told us in so many words that they are
waiting for the industry to make up its mind. That means that the industry, if
it does make up its mind, will be very, very heavily involved in the policy
setting for the next phase of this long standing dispute.
So I think it is true and that private interests will make policy. I am not
saying they will be the only ones, but certainly they will be very important, if
they make up their minds. If they do not, then it will be up to the federal
government to decide. Normally, in a case like this, when it is really an
exception to a general rule that we are talking about - if we are talking, for
instance, of renewing or prolonging the Softwood Lumber Agreement, then I
would say that, if there is no consensus within the industry, obviously we
should refer back to the general rule.
It was not my intention to suggest that the federal government and the
provinces have not worked hard at setting a process under which, in the
absence of the constitutional regulations, as they have in the United States, to
allow the provinces to participate in the process.
COMMENT, MR. HAIGH: I just wanted to add a short comment to
Carl's summary of the relations between the provinces and the federal
government with respect to trade by reminding you, again, of the agreement
on internal trade and the role that it has come to play. Not only does it get
used in trying to resolve disputes among the provinces themselves with
respect to procurement issues and other issues having to do with creating fair
ground rules in terms of investment or trade between the provinces, but it has
also been used, as I mentioned yesterday in the Ethyl case, where a group of
three provinces brought a complaint against the federal government that its
MMT Act had breached the terms of the agreement on internal trade. And
they were successful.
I will still think that was the mechanism that forced the federal
government to turn around and settle its Chapter 11 case with Ethyl. It is an
interesting model, because it was based on virtually the same undertakings as
exist in the NAFTA. National treatment, most favored nation treatments, and
standards of fairness, these are all in the provisions of the agreement on
internal trade. It is intriguing to see this sort of extra constitutional agreement
in play under the various entities. I just mention that as a comment.
COMMENT, MR. GRENIER: There are a couple of reasons why I did
not mention the Internal Trade Agreement. First, I was involved in the
discussions prior to the negotiation of that agreement. I believe I did make
the suggestion at the time, in the early 1980s, that we use the international
model of agreements to deal with internal trade barriers. This was largely
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done, I think. Unfortunately, in the agreement itself, there is more exception
to it than rules. It may have been used successfully in the Ethyl case, and I
am glad of that. But to me, the years that I was involved in the discussions
and negotiations on internal trade are not the best souvenirs I have in my
dealing with the federal government and the provinces. This is the reason I
did not mention it. But indeed, some good may come out of this agreement at
some point.
QUESTION, MR. WOODS: I would just like to go back to Beer I for a
minute and ask a question. In Beer II, a fascinating thing happened. The
GATT panel back in 1992 took a look at U.S. Supreme Court rulings and
opinions of people like John Jackson, and they decided that the U.S. states,
which are sub-nationals, were bound in terms of the market access issues. By
the way, Canada also went after the U.S. federal government on a very
significant commercial tax issue, as well. So it was not all frivolous and
facetious.
The best thing that happened out of Beer II was, if you took this seminar
twenty years ago, or if you went to international settings in the last fifteen
years or so, the only country that was nailed on subnational issues was
Canada. This session fifteen years ago would have featured a big discussion
with our U.S. friends about what the hell the federal and the state
governments were doing. So it adds some balance to the perspective.
With respect to Chapter 11, investor-state, and the issues of
expropriation, if the GATT panel was looking at those kinds of issues, would
the GATT panel be able to make those same rulings? Is the Supreme Court
looking at these cases so that the precedents would not be the same ten years
later?
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: I will answer the first one. I am
not sure I understood the second. But on the first, could a GATT panel look
at these same types of issues? The answer is no, because the WTO does not
really have investment obligations outside of the TRIMS' Agreement, which
is actually not much of an investment agreement. It is really reiterating what
Article 3 and Article 11, the national treatment obligation, and the quota
prohibition obligation in the GATT, already required. So it is a useful
clarification of Article 3 and 11, but it in itself is not very useful. So you will
not see expropriation claims brought before a WTO panel.
QUESTION, MR. WOODS: Some eight years ago, the cases were pretty
clear. They appeared pretty clear in terms of the power of the U.S.
government to bind their states. When you take the issue away from trading
goods to investment or expropriation or even just going back to market
I Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
at Annex IA.
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access, have there been rulings in the last eight years or so that would cloud
the issue more?
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: In fact, I addressed this issue
specifically looking at the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the 1999
article in the Journalof InternationalEconomic Law.
I do not think any of these recent rulings, Lopez or New York, inhibit the
ability of the federal government to bind the states, even in new areas like
services or investment, or in areas like government procurement or areas like
subsidies. It is not a constitutional, legal question in the United States. It is
simply about political constraints. It is not easy - even though the federal
government has the power to preempt the states in these areas, politically
exercising that power is not easy. There are complications, but it is clear that
they are political complications and not legal complications.
The other thing of note that has occurred in the last year, there was a
constitutional challenge to NAFTA over its approval method. We had our
trade agreements in the United States as congressional executive agreements
requiring simple majority of both houses of Congress to approve the
agreement rather than two-thirds of the Senate. NAFT Only sixty-one
senators vote for NAFTA. So there was a challenge to NAFTA in U.S. courts
arguing that NAFTA was required to be approved as a treaty by two-thirds of
the Senate. It could not be a congressional executive agreement. That claim
has failed at the lower court level. I believe there is an appeal in the works on
that. But even that argument, I think, has been properly disposed of by the
lower court.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I just have one comment. Matt, you
mentioned a five-four decision in the Supreme Court. Which way?
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: That is a good question. I
actually think, if I had to put my money on it, that the Supreme Court is
going to invalidate the law. But you do hear a lot of predictions that it will be
a very close call, five-four one way or another, so we will see.
ANSWER, MR. GRENIER: Yes. I realized when I answered Konrad
Von Finckenstein's question, I only addressed the national interest question.
The "no one at the helm" remark in my presentation really was aimed at the
United States. For instance, I remember, for instance, meeting with some
very senior persons from the Department of Commerce with the Minister in
tow. He was arguing that some trade case was actually going against the
national interest of the United States. The U.S. official said "Absolutely. But
he said, you know we are prohibited by law from taking the national interest
into account in these cases."
COMMENT, MR. POTTER: Carl, I would just like to give you the
opportunity to expand a bit on the line on one of your last slides which says,
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"do not negotiate, litigate wherever possible." I am a litigation lawyer. I am
in favor of that. However, it would only be fair to the crowd to point out that
there have been statements from the British Columbia wood industry that
they are not entirely closed to the idea of negotiation. Everybody wants free
trade, but not everyone thinks that litigation is the necessarily the way to get
there.
COMMENT, MR. GRENIER: Absolutely. And I did mention that we are
still far from a consensus within the Canadian softwood lumber industry on
this matter. I certainly hope that we will get a consensus. I do not think
anyone can say right now if we will. We are certainly working hard to do
that. You should not rejoice too quickly on the litigation aspect, because of
course, most of the money will go to U.S. lawyers.
COMMENT, MR. POTTER: They always need help.
COMMENT, MR. DAVIS ROBINSON: Yes, if I could make one more
comment on the issue of the five to four vote. One thing that is not really
appreciated is that most U.S. federal judges do not know very much about
international law. The reason for this is that they do not face very many cases
involving international law issues. That was one of the reasons that the state
department, in my day, fought so hard over the American Law Institute
(ALI) Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, because most federal judges, if
they face an issue that is of any transnational significance, are going to refer
first, very likely, to the ALI restatement. They may have very, very limited
personal experience.
I would recommend, because of the U.S.-Canada relationship, and it is a
model, that more efforts be made in the federal judicial conference to educate
U.S. federal judges. They do not know very much, and that includes the
Supreme Court. A lot of them may not have been involved in that many
cases. So if it is five to four the wrong way, to some extent it is going to be
because of lack of experience and little realization of how important these
issues are. To me it was absolutely ludicrous that over a fifteen year period,
American policy over South Africa was not run in Washington. It was run in
Los Angeles and in New York City.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: One of the ironies that comes
up in the Massachusetts Burma case is that you still read press reports saying
the law was struck down because of the WTO agreements. This is an
indication that international trade agreements are a threat to our sovereignty.
If you read the First Circuit opinion, there is little to no mention of the
WTO at all. It is a domestic constitutional matter where the First Circuit has
said the states are not allowed to operate in this area.
The other thing, on the Restatement and the Supreme Court, the State
Department worried that the Courts would turn to the Restatement too
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quickly. In fact, what you find in some cases, is that they ignore the
Restatement. If you look at the HartfordFire Insurance case in 1993 and
look at the analysis done by the majority, they ignored the Restatement as
well as everything else that there might have been in terms of international
law.
COMMENT, MS. VERNON: It sounds like he just threw you an idea for
a judicial conference in Nebraska.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: I definitely agree with that,
that there is a need for further steps.
COMMENT, MS. VERNON: I am sorry, we have other questions and
comments, but time has arrived. I would like to thank all of you for joining
us. I would particularly like to thank our two speakers. Please join me in
another round of applause for them.

